Debate contribution: Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill: Consideration Stage

Debate contribution by Mr Colin McGrath on 13 May 2025.

MLA

Mr Colin McGrath

Party at the time

Social Democratic and Labour Party

Date

13 May 2025

Type

Debate contribution

Business

Committee Business

Heading

Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill: Consideration Stage

Assembly identifier

Official Report component 4947757

Read the official Assembly record

Text

Thank you, Madam Principal Deputy Speaker. I welcome the opportunity to contribute to the debate on the amendments that have been tabled to the Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill on behalf of the Assembly Commission. I express the thanks of the Assembly Commission to the Chairperson and all members who served on the Ad Hoc Committee that was appointed to scrutinise the Bill. From the outset, we have recognised that this is not a piece of legislation that will win Members any popularity contests. However, the Committee Stage has been important in allowing new sets of eyes to scrutinise the Bill and examine it in detail. That process has also been helpful in dealing with some of the more misleading commentary on the Bill. The Assembly Commission appeared before the Committee twice and dealt with a number of additional points via correspondence. Therefore, it is appropriate that the Assembly Commission acknowledges the work that was undertaken by the members and staff of the Committee. Before I proceed to deal with the amendments in detail, it is worth highlighting a theme that runs through them, and I will return repeatedly to it. The central purpose of the Bill is to ensure that arrangements are in place for the salaries and pensions of Members to be determined independently.

So early on, but go on ahead.

It is independent because that person will not get any financial benefit from it. They are not setting their own wage, but they will bring a depth of understanding of the role. Some Members said that there should not be any understanding of the role in determining how the job is undertaken. If you have somebody there who has undertaken the work and understands, having done the job, what it is about, that allows for a certain breadth of experience to be brought. However, because that person will not benefit from the determinations that are made, of course the board is independent. That is logical. Whilst there are varying options for provisions that could be included in the Bill, the Assembly Commission has been focused on protecting the independence of the remuneration board and avoiding provisions that would reduce its ability to make its own decisions. That principle underpins the position of the Assembly Commission on many of the amendments being debated today. I want, first, to turn to amendment Nos 6 and 7, which the Assembly Commission itself tabled. Clause 4 inserts new section 6A into the Assembly Members (Independent Financial Review and Standards) Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 — the 2011 Act — which makes provisions for temporary appointments to the board. However, following the introduction of the Bill, it occurred to the Assembly Commission that there was a potential issue with the same disqualification and other such provisions as applied to permanent appointments not applying to temporary appointments. The Assembly Commission therefore tabled amendment Nos 6 and 7 to avoid that discrepancy occurring. Amendment No 6 amends clause 4 and substitutes new section 6A(9) with wording that provides:

"a temporary appointment is to be treated for all purposes",

including disqualification from the board,

"as if it were an appointment under section 4(1).'."

of the 2011 Act. The amendment puts more detail in the Bill on temporary appointments and ensures that the full suite of disqualification and termination provisions in Part 1 of the 2011 Act also applies to temporary appointments. Amendment No 7 to clause 4 adds new section 6A(10) to the 2011 Act. That allows the Assembly Commission to make provision for temporary appointments to the remuneration board by order. That is included as a precaution to enable the Assembly Commission to deal with unforeseen circumstances. The new section 6A(10) is included to make clear that the Assembly Commission's powers to make such orders cannot be used to modify the application of new section 4(4) of the 2011 Act, which states that only one former Member of the Assembly can be a member of the remuneration board at any one time. The Assembly Commission engaged with the Ad Hoc Committee on those amendments. The Ad Hoc Committee sought clarification on which Committee would be asked to scrutinise any order brought forward by the Assembly Commission under this legislation in relation to temporary appointment. The Assembly Commission clarified that the Audit Committee would, it believed, be the appropriate Committee to scrutinise any such order, given its existing role in the Assembly Commission's budget. The Assembly Commission communicated that to the Audit Committee, and we are grateful that the Ad Hoc Committee indicated that it is content to support amendment Nos 6 and 7. I turn now to amendment Nos 1, 9, 10, 12 and 14, tabled by the Chairperson of the Ad Hoc Committee. Those amendments insert the word "Independent" into the name of the remuneration board. The Ad Hoc Committee engaged with the Assembly Commission on its intention to introduce those amendments. Section 3 of the 2011 Act makes clear that the board would not be subject to the direction or control of the Assembly or the Assembly Commission. As I said, the Assembly Commission is focused on the detail of the Bill to ensure that the independence of the remuneration board is maintained and embodied in how it operates.

However, in its previous engagement, the Assembly Commission indicated to the Ad Hoc Committee that, if it was of the view that adding the word "Independent" to the remuneration board's title would be helpful to emphasise its independence, the Assembly Commission was prepared to accept that view. The Assembly Commission is therefore content to support amendment Nos 1, 9, 10, 12 and 14.

I now turn to amendment No 2, tabled by Mr Carroll, which seeks to amend clause 3. It has been the Assembly Commission's view that requiring the remuneration board to have regard to the salaries payable to Members of other legislatures is a reasonable benchmarking measure that any such body would expect to carry out when reviewing salary levels. It would help the remuneration board to achieve the objective set out in section 2(2) of the 2011 Act, namely to have:

" a level of remuneration which— (i) fairly reflects the complexity and importance of their functions as members of the Assembly".

It would not prevent the remuneration board from taking account of other factors as it sees fit.

My assessment is that that figure is probably quite low. If you talk to people about MLAs' salaries, 100% of them would probably say that we are paid too much. That is, of course, their view, but it is not the reality that is set out in legislation. We have to find a board that can conduct itself independently to find a level that, it feels, is appropriate — it is not us; we are not going to decide what our salary level will be — and the Bill is about establishing that independent board. The level of inflation at a given time will, undoubtedly, be a factor for the remuneration board to take into consideration. However, amendment No 2 would fundamentally restrict the board's independence and limit the scope of its decisions in a number of ways. If amendment No 2 were accepted and it were made a requirement for the remuneration board not to exceed the most recent rate of inflation, that would have the predominant weight in determining its decisions. However, once the remuneration board has concluded its initial review and taken a decision on a reasonable level of salary for a Member, the board will have the option to decide that an increase in line with inflation should follow in the years after. The key point is that, if the independence of the remuneration board is to be meaningful, the decisions are for it alone to take on the basis of all the factors that, it thinks, are relevant without its hands being tied. Ultimately, if amendment No 2 were passed, the purpose of the Bill would be undermined, as there would be no need to establish and resource the remuneration board. An annual inflationary increase could be provided for without the structures to review and determine the appropriate levels for Members. It is interesting to note that, if we look back to 10 years ago, when there was last a rise in MLAs' wages, we see that the consumer price index is around 30%. That would have meant a £15,000 increase for MLAs in the past 10 years — that is what would happen if the amendment had been in place from that time. That is not a level that I would want to have accepted for the past period. Maybe that is what the proposer of the amendment was looking for. The Assembly Commission, therefore, opposes amendment No 2. With your indulgence, Madam Principal Deputy Speaker, I will now address amendment Nos 3, 5 and 13 together. Those amendments all raise issues that relate to the Windsor framework and essentially connect to the political point that Mr Gaston has made at earlier stages of the Bill about the impact of the Windsor framework on the legislative responsibilities of the Assembly. It is Mr Gaston's prerogative to focus on those issues. The Assembly Commission has had no part in the creation, detail or future of the Windsor framework and will not take a position on such an issue, which is outside of its responsibilities. However, I return to the points that amendment Nos 3 and 5 would limit the discretion of the remuneration board and impact on its independence by making issues around the Windsor framework a predominant factor that influences and determines its decisions. The law-making powers of each legislature in these islands vary. The Bill gives the remuneration board full discretion to take account of the legislative responsibilities of the Assembly and its Members in any benchmarking or other exercise that it undertakes. However, it is a disproportionate approach to tie the operation and decision-making of the remuneration board to an issue outside of its control, the control of the Assembly Commission and, indeed, the control of the Assembly. From a technical perspective, the Assembly Commission is also concerned that amendment Nos 3 and 5 could be considered legally deficient, as legislative competence attaches to the Assembly rather than to individual Members. Like amendment Nos 3 and 5, amendment No 13 would tie the operation of the Bill to the Windsor framework. The Bill will come into effect on the day after the day that it receives Royal Assent. Amendment No 13 would predicate the commencement of key provisions of the Bill on matters related to the Windsor framework. It would postpone those provisions for at least four years until the next vote on the democratic consent process. It is unreasonable to tie the operation of the Bill to those issues, so the Assembly Commission opposes amendment Nos 3, 5 and 13. Clause 3 inserts a new provision into section 2 of the 2011 Act and would impose a requirement on the remuneration board to have regard to the salaries payable to Members of other legislatures. As I have stated previously, the Assembly Commission believes that that is a reasonable measure to ensure that the remuneration board is informed by benchmarking against the salary levels awarded to legislators in other places and is one that it is likely to undertake, whether it is in the Bill or not. Amendment No 4 would remove all reference to the Houses of the Oireachtas and, I assume, is politically motivated from Mr Gaston's perspective. Again, that is his right. However, when the Assembly Commission gave specific consideration to the bodies that are included in that clause, it was not motivated by party political considerations. The Assembly Commission included all the legislatures in these islands with which the Assembly most frequently engages. That would give the remuneration board a number of comparators of differing scale and legislative responsibilities. Removing the Houses of the Oireachtas would therefore limit the scope of the comparators that could be considered. The amendment is also arguably legislatively ineffective, as it would not prevent the remuneration board expanding a benchmarking exercise that it wished to undertake or making its own decision to review the provision for Members of the Houses of the Oireachtas. Finally, from a political perspective, it could be argued that Mr Gaston's amendment is inconsistent with his previous positions. He has previously argued that clause 3 and the requirement to "have regard to" the salaries in other legislatures would inevitably lead to a significant pay rise for Members. However, in tabling amendment No 4, he now seems to seek only to remove specific institutions from that clause rather than to oppose the concept of benchmarking as a whole. Therefore, the Assembly Commission opposes amendment No 4. Clause 5 amends paragraph 1 of schedule 1 to the 2011 Act to remove former membership of the Assembly as grounds for disqualification from membership of the remuneration board. The Assembly Commission considers that to be an important element of the Bill, as it allows the potential for the insight of a former Member's first-hand experience to add value to the remuneration board's work. However, the appointment of a former Member is optional: it is not required. A balance of perspectives is retained by allowing a potential maximum of only one former Member to serve on the remuneration board at any one time. Mr Carroll's amendment No 8 is very different and takes a different approach to the appointment of trade union representatives on the remuneration board. Not only does it require that a trade union representative be appointed to the board but it requires that a majority of the members of the remuneration board be trade union representatives. The Bill does not prevent trade union representatives serving on the remuneration board. I am happy to make it clear that the Assembly Commission has no objection in principle to the possibility of trade union representatives serving on the remuneration board. However, they will be subject to the same independent process of appointment as others, which will see the best candidates from the open recruitment process being appointed on merit. Amendment No 8 would significantly restrict the potential membership of the remuneration board. The Assembly Commission has a concern that it would limit the pool of applicants who could apply.

Of course.

Thank you, and there are also 1·6 million-odd who cannot apply for it, which seems a bit unfair as well. However, I do not mind giving way; it gives me a break from a long speech. Amendment No 8 requires trade union representatives to be appointed as a majority of members on the board but is silent on the specific professional experience or skills that they should bring to the remuneration board.

I thank the Member for his intervention. I think that the approach that is being taken by the Commission is the best one. It is open to everybody, trade union representatives and all; in fact, I hope that there will be trade union representatives on the board. I hope that they apply. They have unique skills that can contribute to this type of work. They understand the importance of a fair and decent wage for everybody. They have a lot of experience that they could bring to it. The issue is with their having the majority of seats on the board. If we have an open and transparent process, it is better that the board be populated with people of different backgrounds rather than just the one background, more or less. As I say, that approach could narrow the range of skills available to the board in performing its functions. The 2011 Act disqualifies certain categories from applying to join the remuneration board to avoid conflicts of interest. That is very different from requiring the majority of the remuneration board to have one specific requirement that would prevent the majority of the population from applying. While appointments to the remuneration board are not ministerial appointments, there is also a risk that the amendment would be contrary to key elements of the requirement of the code of practice previously published by the Commissioner for Public Appointments, including on the grounds of equality, diversity, merit and proportionality. Neither the Assembly nor the Assembly Commission should want to encourage such an approach. The Assembly Commission therefore opposes amendment No 8. Amendment No 11, tabled by Mr Gaston, deals with the issue of consultation. The Assembly Commission has previously clarified that it took account of a number of factors in its approach to the Bill, including the fact that the Assembly had approved a resolution in June 2020 that called for Members' salaries and pensions to be determined independently and that an earlier version of the Bill was subsequently introduced. I note that the Ad Hoc Committee invited responses to inform its scrutiny of the Bill. Amendment No 11 would place a requirement to consult on any future Bill. There are, however, practical and legal issues with amendment No 11. First, the intention of the Bill is to set up the remuneration board and re-establish an independent mechanism to determine Members' salaries. The remuneration board will determine the level of salaries. Once its decisions are made, they will be implemented. There will therefore be no need for the Assembly Commission to introduce a further Bill on those issues, and it has no intention of doing so. Clause 6 requires the remuneration board to publish a draft determination outlining any decisions that it is considering making and allows it to consult on the draft with any other persons whom it considers appropriate. Therefore, there is already a provision that would permit public consultation on the issue of Members' salaries in the future, if the remuneration board considered it valuable. The more significant issue is that there is a risk that amendment No 11 is likely to take the Bill outside the legislative competence of the Assembly. Part 2 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 states that the Assembly may make law in accordance with the relevant provisions of that Part. Part 2 is an excepted matter. The Assembly cannot pass Acts that deal with matters covered by Part 2 of the 1998 Act. Amendment No 11 is concerned with the way in which the Assembly makes laws. It introduces conditions for the introduction of legislation that are not set out in the Northern Ireland Act 1998. That deals with the subject matter of Part 2 of the Act, which sets out the only limitations on the plenary power of the Assembly to make laws. The amendment deals with an excepted matter and would potentially jeopardise the passage of the Bill into law. Amendment No 11 also has the potential to undermine the exercise of the Assembly's statutory functions as set out in section 47 of the 1998 Act in relation to the remuneration of Members. That may also create a risk of the Bill's being referred to the UK Supreme Court. I also note that it is a constitutional principle that an Assembly cannot bind its successors, which would be the effect of amendment No 11. The Assembly Commission therefore opposes amendment No 11. I appreciate that I have taken some time to go through the detail of the amendments.

In summary, the Assembly Commission commends its own amendment Nos 6 and 7 to the House and supports amendment Nos 1, 9, 10, 12 and 14 from the Ad Hoc Committee. The Assembly Commission also supports retaining clauses 3, 5 and 10 in the Bill. The Assembly Commission looks forward to considering the decisions that Members take today in advance of the Further Consideration Stage of the Bill occurring in due course.

I hope that it is noted, as I conclude, that I got through the entire speech without using "renumeration" and stuck to "remuneration", which I think was an achievement.

3,323 words. Text as published by the Northern Ireland Assembly.

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