Debate contribution: Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill: Consideration Stage
Debate contribution by Mr Robbie Butler on .
- MLA
- Mr Robbie Butler
- Party at the time
- Ulster Unionist Party
- Date
- 13 May 2025
- Type
- Debate contribution
- Business
- Committee Business
- Heading
- Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill: Consideration Stage
- Assembly identifier
- Official Report component 4947645
Read the official Assembly record
Text
Thank you, Madam Principal Deputy Speaker. My party's position has been clear throughout. We set it out firmly during the Second Stage debate, in which I spoke. We will support the amendments tabled by the Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee: amendment Nos 1, 9, 10, 12 and 14. As has been outlined, while those amendments may appear straightforward, they serve to further strengthen the independent nature of the board. That has to form the absolute core of the Bill as it goes forward. The Bill has, perhaps understandably, attracted some controversy, although, in truth, it should not have done so. There are those who seek to make it politically contentious, but it is crucial that the remuneration board is entirely independent. That is the intention of the Bill as introduced, and it is consistent with the principles laid out in the Assembly Members (Independent Financial Review and Standards) Act (Northern Ireland) 2011. Nonetheless, given the importance of reinforcing the point beyond doubt, we fully support the proposals to include the word "independent" in the board's title; in fact, that is important. We will also support amendment Nos 6 and 7, which were tabled by the Assembly Commission. Amendment No 6 proposes to remove lines 39 to 41 and replace them with the following wording:
"Subject to the preceding provisions of this section, a temporary appointment is to be treated for all purposes (including, for example, for the purposes of section 5) as if it were an appointment under section 4(1)."
The amendment provides important clarity regarding temporary appointments. It confirms that such appointments are to be treated in all respects as if they were permanent appointments made under section 4(1) of the 2011 Act, thereby ensuring that the full range of disqualification and termination provisions set out in Part 1 of that Act will apply equally to temporary members of the board. That is a necessary and welcome safeguard to protect the integrity and consistency of the board's operations. Amendment No 7 allows the Assembly Commission to make provision by order for the temporary appointment of members to the remuneration board. While we hope that such a power will seldom need to be used, it is a sensible and prudent measure that will ensure that the Commission can act swiftly and lawfully in the face of unforeseen circumstances. It adds an important degree of flexibility to the framework without undermining the board's independence. Together, those amendments strengthen the Bill and provide useful clarity and contingency provisions, and we are content to support them. I turn to amendment Nos 2 and 8 in the name of Mr Carroll. Amendment No 2 would place a statutory obligation on the board when exercising its functions under subsection (1)(a) to ensure that any increase in the salary payable to a Member does not exceed:
"the most recent Consumer Price Index rate of inflation as published by the Office of [sic] National Statistics."
Whilst we understand the intention behind that amendment, particularly given the current economic climate, it undermines, in our view, one of the core purposes of the Bill, which is to safeguard the independent role of the remuneration board. One of the guiding principles behind the 2011 Act was to ensure that decisions on Members' pay were taken out of political hands and entrusted to an impartial body. Amendment No 2 would impose a rigid, externally determined cap on pay increases that would, effectively, limit the board's ability to exercise judgement on the basis of evidence and context.
That would reduce the board's role to little more than that of a formulaic calculator, a move that would cut across the very independence that the legislation seeks to achieve and enforce. Benchmarking against other legislatures is a recognised and reasonable approach for any remuneration body to take. It enables informed, evidence-based decision-making and helps to ensure that pay reflects the responsibilities of the role whilst not deterring people from standing for election, and there are many reasons why people may be deterred from standing for election in this part of the world. That is entirely a matter for the board, which will crucially and independently determine the salary payable to Members of the Assembly. It may well be that, following careful analysis of all relevant information and evidence, the board concludes that such an approach is appropriate. However, I stress again that that decision rests solely with the independent board. In fact —
I think that I have lost my place.
Yes, I have indeed. I might be missing a page. I will move on to amendment No 11, if that is OK. Amendment No 11 is unnecessary. The Bill's intention to reestablish an independent mechanism for setting Members' pay and pensions through the new remuneration board is clear. Once that board is in place, it will carry out that role without the need for further legislation. The Assembly Commission has made no indication of any intention to introduce Bills on that issue. Clause 6 already provides for a robust and transparent consultation process. It requires the board not only to publish a draft determination and consult the Assembly Commission and Members but to have a clear process in place. Adding more statutory obligations would serve only to complicate or duplicate what is already a strong independent framework. We do not support amendment No 13. While I do not question the sincerity of the Member's concerns, his amendment fundamentally distorts the reality of the situation, perhaps conveniently so on the Member's part. The Bill provides a clear and workable commencement clause: it comes into effect the day after it receives Royal Assent. By contrast, amendment No 13 would delay key provisions until every element of EU law that is listed in the Windsor framework, which, I have to remind Members, is the child of Brexit, ceases to apply in Northern Ireland and full legislative competence is returned to the Assembly. That is not within the control of the Assembly, the Commission or any Member of this Parliament. In practical terms, amendment No 13 would indefinitely block the core purpose of the Bill: the establishment of an independent remuneration board to carry out that important work. However, for the avoidance of doubt, the fact that we do not support it does not mean that we support the imposition of the Windsor framework. I have no doubt that the Member will attempt to claim otherwise, but he should not insult the intelligence of the electorate with his amendment. I strongly suspect that he will deliver it in that manner and context, as he has done with other proposals. Voting for amendment No 13, no matter how it is presented, will not change the Windsor framework. What it will do is further obstruct the passage of the Bill. We will support all the amendments that were tabled by the Ad Hoc Committee and the Commission. We will reject the amendments that were tabled by Mr Carroll and Mr Gaston.
1,163 words. Text as published by the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Assessment
Jev’s structured answers met the documented threshold for “not flagged”.
- Overall probability that the activity is being used to promote, exploit or escalate an identity-based controversy: 0.10 (flagging needs at least 0.70; at or below 0.30 is not flagged).
- None of the five culture-war criteria was met (each was below 0.60).
- Assessed as legitimate policy scrutiny (0.91).
- No identity-based framing was identified (0.93).
- Subject area: Constitutional question, Brexit, the Windsor Framework and sovereignty.
- The overall probability was at or below the not-flagging threshold.
This is an AI-generated assessment of the text, made against published criteria. It is not a finding of fact about the MLA or their intentions. The Assembly record itself is the fact.
Jev’s structured answers
| Question | Probability | Met? |
|---|---|---|
| Identity framing | 0.04 | No |
| Sectarian or communal antagonism | 0.05 | No |
| Cultural grievance politics | 0.01 | No |
| Dog-whistle messaging | 0.17 | No |
| Controversy escalation | 0.13 | No |
| Legitimate policy scrutiny | 0.91 | Yes |
| Overall judgement | 0.10 | At or below not-flagging threshold |
| Option | Probability |
|---|---|
| No identity-based framing (chosen) | 0.93 |
| Reports or questions it | 0.02 |
| Criticises or condemns it | 0.01 |
| Adopts it | 0.03 |
| Subject | Probability |
|---|---|
| Constitutional question, Brexit, the Windsor Framework and sovereignty | 0.93 |
| No identity-related subject | 0.07 |
| Flags, emblems, symbols, names and memorials | 0.00 |
| Parades, bonfires and commemorations | 0.00 |
| Irish language, Ulster-Scots and language policy | 0.00 |
Assessed 21 October 2026 at 12:33 UTC by jev-1.13.0 (requested as typesafe/jev) under rubric 2026.10-r9, methodology 1.9.
Disagree with this assessment?
Classifications can be challenged. A person reads every challenge, and any change is recorded publicly above with its reason.