Debate contribution: Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill: Second Stage

Debate contribution by Mr Trevor Clarke on 17 February 2025.

MLA

Mr Trevor Clarke

Party at the time

Democratic Unionist Party

Date

17 February 2025

Type

Debate contribution

Business

Assembly Business

Heading

Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill: Second Stage

Assembly identifier

Official Report component 4802430

Read the official Assembly record

Text

I beg to move

Madam Principal Deputy Speaker, the Assembly Commission welcomes the debate on the Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill. It is an opportunity to present more detail on the Bill to the House and to clarify points that have been made since the Bill was introduced two weeks ago. The Assembly Commission recognises that there is no good time to deal with issues relating to Members' salaries and pensions. Understandably, there will be a range of views, including negative ones, amongst the public whom we serve, and there is undoubtedly an opportunity to play politics with the issue. Therefore, while we are here to debate the Bill's general principles, it is important to make a distinction from the outset between process and outcome. The House is debating a largely technical Bill that deals with the process of how Members' salaries and pensions are determined. We are not debating or deciding what the level of Members' salaries and pensions will or should be. If the Bill is passed, only the independent remuneration board will decide that. I turn briefly to the history of the issue. As the House will know, in 2011, the Assembly passed the Assembly Members (Independent Financial Review and Standards) Act (Northern Ireland) 2011, which created an independent body, the independent financial review panel (IFRP). The IFRP's function was to determine the salaries and pensions payable to Members and the expenditure that Members can reclaim to rent constituency offices, appoint staff, travel in their constituencies and so on. In 2016, the IFRP made a determination that governed Members' salaries and office cost expenditure and a determination that governed Members' pensions. The IFRP's decisions on salaries and pensions are still in place and continue to govern Members' salaries and pensions. In 2015, even before the panel issued the determinations, the Assembly Commission began to review options for reforming the system for providing financial support to Members. The term of office for the then IFRP came to an end in 2016. The Assembly Commission deferred taking a decision to proceed with appointing a new panel pending further consideration of the options for reform. Political developments soon afterwards meant that the Assembly Commission did not want to return to the matter while the Assembly was not sitting. However, it quickly became clear that the system for staffing and office cost expenses set up by the IFRP in 2016 did not adequately provide for the pressures that Members and their employees face in representing their constituents. Consequently, on 30 June 2020, a few months after the Assembly returned on 11 January 2020 and after much detailed consideration by the Assembly Commission, the Assembly agreed to change the way in which allowances for the costs of Members' offices were determined. At that time, the Assembly passed a resolution that the Assembly Commission be given the power to make determinations on Members' allowances and that decisions on salaries and pensions should continue to be made by an independent body. That has been the Assembly's settled position for some five years. The resolution in June 2020 gave the Assembly Commission legal authority to determine allowances, but it recognised that further legislative change would be needed to resolve the overlapping issues. That was because, technically, the IFRP retained the power to make determinations on allowances for Members' offices under the 2011 Act. Should the IFRP or a similar successor body be appointed without the necessary legislative change, two separate bodies would have the power to make determinations on staffing and office cost expenditure that can be reclaimed by Members at the same time. That is undesirable and could lead to a legal uncertainty. The Bill will remove that uncertainty by reflecting in law the position that the Assembly has already resolved twice, in June 2020 and this month, and by providing the independent body to deal alone with salaries and pensions. After the Assembly passed the resolution in June 2020, the Assembly Commission introduced the Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill in December 2020. However, as it soon became clear that the pandemic had not ended as soon as we would all have liked it to, the Assembly Commission decided not to take the Bill forward, when a heavy burden of legislation was coming before the Assembly. Since then, the Assembly Commission has continued to consider the Bill. It is only now, a year after the Assembly's return but before the heavy legislative workload towards the end of the mandate begins, that the Assembly Commission has come back to the House to introduce the Bill. In summary, the House is debating a Bill that is largely technical and that deals with the process by which Members' salaries and pensions are determined. If the Bill is passed, only the independent remuneration board will decide the levels of Members' salaries and former Members' pensions for. The word "independent" is key. Neither the Assembly Commission nor Members will be involved in the decisions on Members' salaries. On behalf of the Commission, I thank all Assembly Commission officials for the detailed work that they have done on the Bill and on related issues over those many years. Given the context that I set out, the Assembly Commission can hardly be accused of rushing to bring the Bill forward, and the Commission has not hidden the fact that it is bringing the Bill forward, as some have implied. In June 2020, the Assembly resolved to give authority to the Commission to determine allowances. The Assembly Commission made it clear that it intended to introduce the Bill and change the remit and scope of the IFRP. Not only was the Bill brought before the House in December 2020 but the Assembly Commission has been clear since then, even at the most recent debate on the Assembly Commission's Budget and the most recent Assembly Commission Question Time, that it was considering the introduction of the Bill. I will return to the substantive provisions in the Bill. Clause 1 will rename the IFRP "the Remuneration Board". That name reflects the focus that the new independent body will have on salaries and pensions. Clause 2 will amend the 2011 Act to give it legal consistency with the Assembly's resolutions of June 2020 and this month so that the board does not have the power to determine the staffing and cost allowance expenditures that Members claim or the allowances that are payable to Members who have resigned or lost their seats. Since the Assembly voted by resolution in June 2020 to give the Assembly the function of determining the allowances for staffing and office cost expenditure that Members reclaim, the Assembly Commission has published two determinations enabling it to address a range of issues that are either insufficiently addressed or not at all addressed by the determinations that the IFRP made. Those include a range of issues relating to salaries and terms and conditions for Members' staff, including holiday, sickness and maternity pay; the level of staffing support that is made available; Members' ability to put their telephone numbers on office signage; the provision of maternity leave support for Members; and, as was just recently added, the specific provision for Members to put security measures in place at their constituency offices and their homes. The Assembly Commission thanks the Assembly Commission officials who provided advice on those matters and gave the benefit of their experience on the difficulties with the previous provisions. Clause 3 will insert a new section 2A into the 2011 Act making it a requirement for the board, when making a determination under section 2(1) of the 2011 Act, to "have regard to" salaries that are payable to Members of the House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Parliament, the House of Representatives of Ireland and the Senate of Ireland. It is not unusual in public- and private-sector organisations for benchmarking exercises to be used as part of an evaluation process to ensure that relevant, comparable roles are taken into consideration when examining appropriate levels of remuneration. The purpose of the Bill is to establish an independent board to determine the salaries and pensions of those who serve as legislators. As there is only one legislature in Northern Ireland, it is obvious that benchmarking comparisons will be made with other legislatures on these islands, the Members of which conduct similar roles to Members here. The requirement for the remuneration board to give due regard to the position in other legislatures simply provides that benchmarking take place; it does not in any way limit the remuneration board from considering other factors that it considers to be relevant. It is expected that that will be just one element that the new remuneration board will take into account. Ultimately, as the remuneration board will be independent, it will be for it to decide the range of factors that it wishes to consider, the weight that it gives to benchmarking against other places and the view that it takes on appropriate salary levels. Clause 4 will insert a new section 6A into the 2011 Act to permit the appointment of a temporary chair and temporary members of the board, pending the usual process of five-year fixed-term appointments under section 4 of the 2011 Act. The temporary appointments lapse after 12 months but may be renewed, ensuring continuity in the functioning of the board. Other provisions of the Bill provide for the board to approach the dates of publication of determinations in a structured way. The absence of membership of the board would be undesirable.

Clause 4 will also provide the Assembly Commission with an order-making power to allow it to make further provision about temporary appointments. Any order would have to be approved in draft by the Assembly before it could take effect.

Clause 5 removes the bar on former Assembly Members being members of the remuneration board, therefore putting former Assembly Members on the same footing as former Members of other Parliaments and councillors, for example. However, it ensures that no more than one former Assembly Member may serve on the board at any one time. For the avoidance of doubt, that is not the same as saying that a former Member will be on the remuneration board. There will be an open recruitment process for the board, and that will be independently overseen by the Clerk/Chief Executive of the Assembly, who will form a panel of internal and external people of appropriate experience. The recruitment panel will not involve members of the Assembly Commission or Members or former Members of the Assembly. Members from across the House will recognise that there was a perception that a number of decisions made by the IFRP did not reflect the realities of the role of Assembly Members on the ground. The Assembly Commission considers that allowing for the insight of a former Assembly Member's first-hand experience could add value to the remuneration board's work while retaining a balance of perspective on the board by allowing only one former Member to serve on the board at a time. Some have called on the Assembly Commission to follow the example of the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) in the arrangements that we put in place. I can confirm that it is an example of how the Assembly Commission has done that: IPSA is legally required to appoint a former MP to its board. Clause 6 amends section 11 of the 2011 Act to provide a more clearly structured process around making determinations. First, it provides that the board must, so far as is reasonably practical, make a determination at least six months before the date of the poll for the next Assembly election so that those considering standing for election have notice of the remuneration that they would receive if elected. Secondly, it provides for the publication of the determinations in draft and a consultation on the drafts before a determination is made. Finally, it provides that, if the board intends to form an opinion but, due to exceptional circumstances, should make more than one determination in respect of each Assembly, the board must consult the Assembly Commission. Consultation would also be required if the board were considering making a determination ahead of an election that occurs within a year of a previous election. That allows the Assembly to achieve a balance between making determinations in response to necessary circumstances and ensuring value for money, on the basis that members of the remuneration board will be paid for the number of days that the work requires. Clause 7 makes minor and consequential amendments, including amendments throughout the 2011 Act to reflect the change of the name from "Panel" to "Board". Clause 8 provides that the determinations made under sections 47 and 48 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 or under the 2011 Act will continue to have effect until superseded. That ensures continuity of the law. Finally, clauses 9, 10 and 11 respectively define the terms of the Bill, provide for its commencement and set out its short title. I have addressed the history and the contents of the Bill, and as I conclude, I will briefly address the point made in relation to the report that the Assembly Commission presented to the Audit Committee last year. The Assembly Commission laid its document in the Business Office to ensure that Members had the information for the debate on the Assembly Commission's budget 2025-26 on 9 December 2024. Some have tried to portray that the Assembly Commission took a position in that briefing document on what the level of salaries for Members should be: that is clearly not true. It was a briefing document provided by the Assembly Commission's officials before they appeared before the Audit Committee as part of the normal budget-setting process for the Assembly Commission. The purpose of the document was to outline the Assembly Commission's budget requirements for 2025-26 and the budgetary pressures that it might face in the future. The report makes it clear that the Assembly Commission in the 2025-26 budget required does not include any budget amount should there be a review of the Members' salaries and does not attempt to predict how a future remuneration board may deal with the issue. The report pointed out that, if a future remuneration board were to increase the salary payable to Members, that would be notified to the Department of Finance in order to secure the necessary funding at the appropriate time. In that specific context, the report noted that, given salaries elsewhere, there is the potential for the remuneration board to recommend an increase in salaries, and the Assembly Commission would therefore have to notify the Department of Finance of that budgetary pressure. The level of salaries elsewhere is only a matter of fact. For the record, at no point has the Assembly Commission discussed, let alone taken a view on, what the salary of a Member should be. Members of the House and those on the outside will undoubtedly have a range of views on that question. However, the Assembly Commission is abundantly clear that it is a matter to be determined entirely independently by an independent remuneration board and that independent body alone. As I outlined, if the Bill is passed, it will be for the Clerk/Chief Executive of the Assembly to form a panel of independent individuals to conduct a recruitment competition to appoint members to that board. Once appointed, the members of the board will undertake a process to decide a range of factors that it wants to take into account in determining what level of salary and pension a Member should receive. It will then publish a draft determination of its findings and consult on that before publishing a final determination for implementation. Therefore, if the Bill is passed, there will be plenty of opportunity for further engagement on the level of Members' salary and pension, and the Assembly Commission is agreed that it is for the independent remuneration board alone to lead and decide on that process. For the avoidance of doubt for those inside or outside the Assembly, let me re-state that the passage of the Bill does not change the salary level of Members by one penny. However, the House needs to be clear that, if the Bill does not pass, the Assembly will not have regularised the legal position following the resolutions that have been already agreed. It will also mean that the Assembly has not put arrangements in place for the salaries and pensions of Members to continue to be determined independently, consistent with decisions that have already been made. I look forward to Members' contributions. On behalf of the Assembly Commission, I commend the Bill to the Assembly.

2,786 words. Text as published by the Northern Ireland Assembly.

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