Debate contribution: Age Discrimination (Goods, Facilities and Services) Bill: Second Stage

Debate contribution by Ms Claire Sugden on 20 October 2026.

MLA: Ms Claire Sugden
Party at the time: Independent
Date: 20 October 2026
Type: Debate contribution
Business: Private Members' Business
Heading: Age Discrimination (Goods, Facilities and Services) Bill: Second Stage
Assembly identifier: Official Report component 5798473

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I have not considered that example, but I suppose that it fits into the argument about indirect discrimination in the use of digital services. A policy of auto-renewal is arguably such an example, in that a group might disproportionately affected by that. That could constitute age discrimination under the Bill. In that regard, the Bill aims to ensure that financial providers are informed about those practices. A huge body of guidance was developed following the Equality Act 2010, and the Bill instructs the Equality Commission to provide similar guidance. It is not something that I have thought about, but it will be important to include those examples in the interest of fairness. Insurance companies may use reliable statistical evidence to assess risk, and age may be relevant to that assessment. We should not expect insurers to disregard evidence of genuine differences in risk, but neither should age automatically become a justification for whatever restrictions or premiums a provider chooses. The relevant legal framework must allow treatment to be assessed: what evidence supports it, what legitimate aim is being pursued and whether the treatment is proportionate. The same principle applies in other contexts. A healthcare provider may take account of clinical evidence, or a transport operator may provide age-related concessions in order to promote access. A leisure provider may introduce restrictions for legitimate safety reasons. Those distinctions are not automatically unlawful, but they must operate within the proposed relevant statutory framework. The Bill's purpose is not to insist that everyone must always be treated identically; it is to ensure that differences in treatment are lawful and, where required, are properly justified. That distinction is fundamental to understanding the legislation. Part 3 contains the central prohibition concerning goods, facilities and services. It applies broadly to services provided to the public or to a section of the public, including private businesses and relevant public services and functions. It covers areas such as banking, insurance, accommodation, recreation, transport, professional services and other everyday activities. The prohibition addresses the refusal of services, discriminatory terms, termination of services and other detrimental treatment. It also applies the relevant harassment and victimisation protections, and its breadth matters. Age-based treatment can arise in many circumstances. A person may be refused insurance, accommodation or access to a leisure activity, or a public authority may operate eligibility criteria that distinguish between people of different ages. Some distinctions will be legitimate, while others will not. The Bill's purpose is to establish a consistent framework through which that treatment can be examined, and I particularly welcome its relevance to public services. Public authorities already have important equality responsibilities, but the substantive right established by the Bill would provide an additional means of addressing unjustified age discrimination. Part 4 concerns exceptions to the services protection. They are important because age can legitimately influence decisions in ways that require a carefully constructed legal framework. Age may be relevant to health and safety, financial risk, safeguarding, service eligibility or the provision of benefits to particular groups. The legislation must recognise those circumstances, but exceptions also require scrutiny. If they are too narrow, legitimate activity may be unnecessarily restricted; if they are too broad, the substantive protection may become ineffective. The Bill seeks to balance those considerations. Clause 12 allows for proportionate positive action. Sometimes, people of different ages experience particular disadvantages, have different needs or are under-represented in certain activities and an organisation may wish to take steps to address that. For example, a community organisation might identify that older people are significantly under-represented in an activity and develop a programme to encourage their participation. The Bill is not intended to prevent that; indeed, it would be counterproductive were legislation that is designed to promote equality undermined organisations seeking to address age-related disadvantage. Positive action must, however, have a proper basis. There should be a reasonable belief that the disadvantage, different need or under-representation exists, and the action must be proportionate. For example, if a scheme is limited to people aged 65 and over, there should be a rational connection between that threshold and the purpose of the scheme. That does not require a mathematically perfect age threshold, but it does require a defensible basis for that decision, and the law allows for reason and flexibility. Positive action should also be distinguished from routine-based commercial concessions and other legitimate differential treatment. Depending on their nature and purpose, different provisions may permit different arrangements. Clause 13 concerns the relationship between the Bill and existing statutory authority. There are circumstances in which legislation already requires or permits different treatments on the grounds of age, such as the purchase of alcohol. The purpose of the provision is to ensure that the Bill operates coherently alongside those arrangements, but the breadth of the exception requires consideration. It should not become a means through which the new protection is unnecessarily undermined. I would welcome the Committee's scrutiny of how the provision interacts with existing and future legislation. Clauses 14 and 15 provide mechanisms through which exceptions may be specified by regulations. I anticipate that Members will ask why all exceptions are not in the primary legislation. The answer is that goods, facilities and services cover an enormous range of activities. There may be legitimate age-based distinctions in health and social care, insurance, transport, safeguarding, sport and concessionary schemes, and it would be difficult to anticipate every relevant circumstance in the primary legislation. A regulation-making mechanism allows issues to be considered in detail in a way that is informed by evidence and consultation. Flexibility must, however, be accompanied by appropriate safeguards. Clause 14(3) therefore requires:
"that any excepted treatment is— (a) a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim; and (b) no more than is necessary to achieve that legitimate aim."
The clause requires consultation with the Equality Commission and other appropriate persons, and the regulations are to be subject to the draft affirmative procedure. That means that the Assembly must approve draft regulations before they can be made. That is important. An exception may determine whether a particular age-based treatment is lawful. The Assembly should therefore retain an appropriate role in scrutinising such decisions. Financial services deserve particular consideration. Age can be relevant to legitimate commercial and actuarial decisions. An insurer may rely on statistical evidence when assessing risk. A lender may need to consider affordability, repayment periods and other financial circumstances, and I recognise those realities. I do not want legislation that unnecessarily restricts the availability or affordability of financial products, but nor do I believe that financial services should receive a blanket exception from age discrimination protection. Access to financial products can have significant consequences for someone's independence and financial security. Clause 15 therefore establishes particular considerations for financial services exceptions. Those include reliable actuarial or statistical data, relevant underwriting or commercial factors, access to financial products and consistency with protections elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Importantly, it prevents regulations under clause 14 from providing a blanket financial services exemption. The intention is to accommodate legitimate risk assessment while maintaining meaningful protection. There is a deliberate distinction between the approach taken in the Bill and that in the Equality Act 2010 framework that exists in Great Britain. Its framework contains specific exemptions permitting certain age-based practices in financial services. In developing the Bill, I considered whether equivalent exceptions should be reproduced here and ultimately took a different approach. The Bill begins with the general principle of protection and provides mechanisms through which appropriate exceptions may be developed. That distinction is important. Rather than beginning by excluding an entire area of activity from protection, the Bill considers the circumstances in which different treatment can legitimately be permitted. I recognise that financial services providers need certainty and that inappropriate restrictions could have implications for the availability and affordability of products, which is why engagement with the industry matters. I discussed the issues with the Association of British Insurers, and I welcome the opportunity for further engagement alongside conversations with other financial bodies, because there are legitimate questions to be asked about the interaction between the general prohibition, objective justification and the exceptions provided through regulations. Those deserve careful scrutiny, but meaningful consumer protection and a workable framework for providers are not mutually exclusive. My objective is to ensure that legitimate differences in treatment can continue without placing an entire sector beyond the protection of the law.
I acknowledge the relationship between exception-making powers and clause 46. Clause 46 provides for general regulation-making powers, but subsection 2 provides for a specific power to:
"amend Part 3 so as to render lawful"
conduct that would otherwise be unlawful under clause 10. That is a significant power, because Part 3 contains the central services prohibition. It therefore deserves examination in relation to the ordinary administrative operation of regulations. In particular, the relationship with the safeguards in clauses 14 and 15 needs to be clear. Clause 14 expressly provides for consultation and proportionality requirements. Clause 15 establishes specific conditions concerning financial services. Clause 46(2) does not expressly reproduce all those safeguards. I would therefore welcome the Committee's consideration of whether the relationship between those provisions should be clarified or strengthened. My intention is not to create a means by which substantive protections can subsequently be removed without proper justification but to provide necessary flexibility while preserving the purpose of the legislation. If the drafting can be improved to ensure that that balance is maintained, I am very much open to amendments. The Bill also contains exceptions concerning small dwellings; particular arrangements for care provided in the home; employment-related matters; and associations. Those provisions recognise that different circumstances may require different legal treatment. For example, privacy considerations in someone's home may differ substantially from those that apply to a commercial accommodation provider. Likewise, an organisation established principally to benefit people of a particular age group should be able to continue to operate within the relevant statutory framework. The provisions are intended to ensure that protection is practical and proportionate. The Bill seeks not to make every age-based distinction unlawful but to prohibit unjustified discrimination while recognising that legitimate differences in treatment can and should continue. I turn to the Equality Commission and the enforcement provisions. A legal right is of limited value if people cannot understand it, exercise it or obtain a remedy when it is breached. Part 5 extends the Equality Commission's functions to age discrimination in goods, facilities and services. Those functions will include promoting equality of access; working towards eliminating unlawful discrimination; providing research, education and guidance; and discharging enforcement-related responsibilities. The commission undertakes comparable functions under existing equality legislation, and the Bill builds on that institutional expertise. Its educational role will be particularly important. The objective should be not simply to establish a new basis for litigation. We should want organisations to understand their responsibilities and to comply with them; we should want individuals to understand their rights; and we should want discriminatory practices to be addressed before they result in disputes. Effective guidance and awareness-raising will be central to that. Part 6 establishes the principal enforcement mechanisms. The central discrimination protections operate through civil proceedings, including claims in the County Court. The intention is not that an ordinary act of discrimination should automatically result in criminal prosecution; instead, the Bill creates a civil route through which the unlawful treatment may be challenged. It addresses matters including time limits, the burden of proof, information gathering, and assistance from the Equality Commission. Those provisions are important. In discrimination cases, the person affected might know that they have been treated less favourably but might not know why. Relevant information may be held by the service provider, and the legal framework therefore needs an appropriate means of examining the decision and determining whether unlawful discrimination occurred. The Bill draws on established equality law approaches to those questions. The Bill also provides mechanisms concerning formal investigations; non-discrimination notices; persistent discrimination; and undertakings. Those mechanisms are important because discrimination may arise from a wider organisational policy rather than an isolated incident. The law must be capable of addressing individual complaints and broader patterns of unlawful conduct. Although the principal framework is civil law, there are certain enforcement-related breaches that may constitute criminal offences. The central purpose, however, remains the creation of meaningful, enforceable protection against unlawful age discrimination. Part 7 addresses contractual protections. There would be little point in establishing statutory rights if organisations could simply exclude them through contractual terms. The Bill therefore provides safeguards against attempts to contract out the protection. I also wanted to distinguish the person entering into the contract from the person potentially affected by discrimination. For example, a parent may enter into an insurance arrangement relating to a 16- or 17-year-old. The fact that the parent is the contracting party does not automatically resolve whose age is relevant to the allegation of discrimination. The conduct, the person affected and the relevant statutory provisions must also be considered. The issue that arose from the Committee Chair's engagement illustrates why relationships between contractual arrangements and the rights of individuals deserve scrutiny. The purpose of Part 7 is principally to prevent contractual provisions from undermining statutory protection. It should not be treated as resolving every question concerning who may bring a claim about a particular contractual arrangement. I will address the practical implications of implementing the Bill. New statutory protections bring responsibilities. Public authorities, businesses and voluntary organisations may need to review policies and practices. Staff may require training. The institutions responsible for enforcement may require additional resources. Those are legitimate considerations, and I do not dismiss them, but I also think that we should recognise the difference between creating an entirely new institutional framework and extending responsibilities within the structures that already exist. The Bill takes the latter approach. We already have an Equality Commission, we already have equality law procedures and we already have courts capable of determining civil discrimination claims. The intention is to build upon that existing infrastructure rather than duplicate it. That should assist with the Bill's implementation. It does not, however, mean that implementation will necessarily be cost-neutral. I anticipate three principal categories of cost. First, there are the additional responsibilities placed upon the Equality Commission. Secondly, there are the compliance costs for public authorities, businesses and voluntary organisations. Thirdly, there are the potential costs associated with investigations, complaints and litigation. The Equality Commission may require additional staff, administrative resources and funding for guidance, education and enforcement. Indeed, the commission indicated during the consultation that appropriate funding would be necessary to discharge those additional responsibilities, and that deserves serious consideration. We should not establish new statutory responsibilities without examining whether the institution responsible has sufficient capacity to fulfil them. In the public sector, organisations may need to review eligibility criteria, policies and administrative procedures, which is what Deborah Erskine spoke to earlier. For example, a council may need to examine the age restrictions applying to leisure facilities; a public-service provider may need to consider whether an age threshold is justified; and a health and social care trust may need to review relevant policies to ensure that they comply with the new protection. Those reviews may involve legal advice, staff training or changes to procedures. However, many public authorities already have established equality arrangements, including expertise developed through their section 75 responsibilities, and that experience should also assist in implementation. It does not replace the substantive duties created by the Bill, but it provides a foundation upon which organisations can build. Private businesses and voluntary organisations will also need to understand their responsibilities. For some, that may involve reviewing existing policies and providing basic training. For others, particularly organisations operating complex age-based eligibility systems, the implications may be more substantial. Clear guidance will therefore be important in helping organisations comply without incurring unnecessary costs. I also distinguish the cost of administering the legislation from the possible financial implications of changing a particular service delivery practice. The Bill does not establish an unrestricted entitlement to every service, nor does it prevent legitimate age-based restrictions where the relevant legal requirements are satisfied. There may, however, be circumstances in which an organisation needs to change an existing practice because the practice cannot be justified, and that could involve expenditure. For example, changing an age-based eligibility criterion may affect how a public service is delivered, or a business may need to reconsider conditions attached to a particular product. We should acknowledge that that is a possibility. However, the fact that compliance may involve costs is not by itself a reason to leave unjustified discrimination without legal protection. The proper question is whether the obligations are proportionate, clearly understood and capable of being implemented effectively. There may also be additional complaints, investigations and civil proceedings, and that is to be expected when a new statutory protection is introduced. We should not assume, however, that every complaint will proceed to court. Education, guidance and early resolution may prevent or resolve disputes. The eventual demand will depend on awareness, compliance and the nature of the complaints that arise. Those factors make precise forecasting difficult, and the explanatory and financial memorandum identifies the anticipated areas of expenditure. However, I acknowledge that it does not provide a definitive monetary estimate for implementation. I, therefore, will welcome further examination of those matters during the Committee Stage, if the Second Stage passes today. In particular, I would welcome a detailed assessment from the Equality Commission of its anticipated staffing and funding arrangements. I would also welcome engagement with the Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunals Service, relevant departments and public bodies, which should help establish a clear picture of the financial implications before the legislation completes its passage. I will not promise Members that implementation will involve no additional public expenditure, but using existing institutions provides a sensible starting point for managing the costs. There may also be wider social and economic benefits from reducing unjustified discrimination, including improved participation, independence and access to services, and those benefits matter as well. However, I would not present them as a guaranteed financial saving without the evidence necessary to support that conclusion. Clause 44 requires guidance to be published before the principal substantive provisions commence, and that guidance should help service providers and the public understand the prohibition, justification test, exceptions and practical examples of lawful and unlawful treatment. I would particularly welcome sector-specific guidance. A small hotel should be able to understand whether its age-related booking conditions are lawful. A community organisation should understand when it may operate an age-specific programme, and a financial services provider should have clarity about legitimate risk assessment and the relevant exceptions. The Bill provides for the principal substantive provisions to commence 12 months after Royal Assent. Part 5, which concerns the Equality Commission's functions, comes into operation sooner than those 12 months, and the sequencing is intended to provide time for preparation, guidance and implementation. It is important that organisations have a reasonable opportunity to understand and meet their obligations. Clause 45 requires a review of legislation within three years of the substantive provisions coming into operation, followed by further reviews at intervals of no more than five years. That would provide an opportunity to assess how the protections are operating, whether the exceptions remain appropriate and whether implementation has revealed issues requiring further attention. It also provides an opportunity to consider further development. As I explained earlier, I would welcome an examination of whether the review provisions should expressly require consideration of extending protection to children under the age of 16. That would provide a structured means of returning to the issue informed by evidence and experience. I also acknowledge the legal and procedural work involved in bringing the legislation forward. The Bill has required legislative competence to be considered, and its interaction with existing statutory frameworks, including financial services provisions and relevant consent requirements. The Bill was referred to the Secretary of State for consent, and that consent has been obtained, which is an important part of the legislative process. It does not, however, remove the separate requirement that the Bill's provisions fall within the legislative competence of the Assembly or its responsibility to scrutinise them. I recognise those responsibilities, and welcome further examination were necessary. I recognise that the Bill is substantial. I recognise that Members may have concerns about particular provisions. There are legitimate questions about age thresholds, exceptions, delegated powers, enforcement and implementation. There may be areas where the drafting can be improved. I have never approached the legislation on the basis that every word must remain exactly as introduced. The development of the Bill has involved making decisions, considering different perspectives and identifying the most appropriate approach. I expect that process to continue through the legislative route. I welcome the expertise of the Committee for the Executive Office, the Department’s officials — who are, sadly, not here — equality bodies, service providers and other stakeholders. In particular, my conversations with the children sector and the insurance industry demonstrate why detailed scrutiny matters. Different organisations will have different concerns, and those concerns all deserve consideration, but there is an important distinction between being open to improving legislation and being uncertain about its underlying purpose.
I am confident about the purpose of the Bill. The principle is to prohibit unjustified age discrimination in everyday services while recognising that legitimate and proportionate differences in treatment can continue. The detailed provisions are there to give effect to that principle. Where they can be strengthened, I welcome that constructive engagement.
Before concluding, I acknowledge that many people have contributed to bringing the legislation before the House. First and foremost, I thank my constituents, particularly the older people's groups and individuals who have raised the issue with me over many years. Their experiences, concerns and determinations have been the motivation behind the work. I also thank my parliamentary assistant, Bethany Holmes, for her support and assistance throughout the Bill's development. I acknowledge Age NI, the Commissioner for Older People, the Equality Commission, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and many other organisations and individuals who have engaged with the issue. Some contributed directly to the development of the Bill. Others have advocated for reform over many, many years. Their work has helped to ensure that the absence of age discrimination protection has remained on the public policy agenda. I also thank the Assembly Bill Office, the legislative drafters and wider Assembly staff who have assisted me throughout the process. Producing legislation of this scale requires considerable work, and I am grateful for their professionalism, expertise and support. I also acknowledge the Committee for the Executive Office. I appreciate the engagement that has taken place, and I recognise that detailed scrutiny of a Bill of this size will require significant work from Committee members and staff. I look forward to working constructively with them should the Bill proceed, and I thank Members in advance for their contributions to today's debate. I will finish by returning to where I began. When I was first elected to the Assembly in 2014, I went out in my constituency to meet the people whom I had been elected to represent. I met community organisations, voluntary groups and individuals doing extraordinary things in their communities. Many of those groups were made up of older people who were active, engaged and determined to continue contributing to the places in which they lived. They were not asking for special treatment or privileges; they were asking to be treated fairly. They were asking why, in Northern Ireland, they did not enjoy the same protection against age discrimination in everyday services as people elsewhere already had. That was a perfectly reasonable question in 2014 and an even more reasonable question in 2026. Twelve years have passed. We have had further debate and consultations. We have examined proposals and seen legislation of this kind operating elsewhere, yet the gap remains. During that time, Northern Ireland's population has continued to age. By the middle of next year, there are projected to be more people aged 65 and over living in Northern Ireland than children under the age of 16. I sincerely hope that 2027 will be the year in which the Bill, if supported by the House, receives Royal Assent. There would be something particularly meaningful about those two milestones coinciding. At a time when Northern Ireland is becoming an older society, the Assembly has an opportunity to establish protections that recognise the rights of people as they age. There is something particularly fitting about having the debate during Positive Ageing Month, given that recognising the contribution of older people is important. Just last week, we had the Older People's Parliament in the Assembly, and its Members talked about what the Assembly has done for them. Would it not be wonderful if the Assembly could finally enact what they have wanted for years? Recognising the contribution of older people is important. Celebrating their lives, achievements and participation in society is important, but, as legislators, we have a responsibility to ensure that our legislation reflects the rights and needs of the people whom we represent. We can do that in the Chamber. I recognise that there are questions about individual provisions, and I hope that I have addressed many of those today. I fully expect that further matters will arise during Committee Stage. I also ask Members to distinguish between the detailed scrutiny that must take place and the general principles that we are considering today at Second Stage. We are being asked whether Northern Ireland should establish meaningful legal protection against unjustified age discrimination in goods, facilities and services. That is the central principle of the Bill. It is already recognised in other areas of our equality law. It is reflected in legislation elsewhere in the United Kingdom and Ireland, and people and organisations across Northern Ireland have been calling for it for many years. The Bill recognises that age can be relevant to legitimate decisions. It recognises that, sometimes, different treatment is necessary. It provides for exceptions, enforcement and review. However, it also establishes the principle that people should not be subject to unjustified discrimination simply because of their age. Where unlawful discrimination occurs, there should be a meaningful remedy. That is a reasonable expectation. It is one to which people in Northern Ireland should already be entitled. There is a wider point about the responsibility of the Assembly. We are elected to represent our constituents. We scrutinise government, hold Ministers to account and debate the challenges that face our society. However, we are also legislators. One of the most important responsibilities that is entrusted to us is the ability to change the law when it is inadequate. That is how we make a real and lasting difference to people's lives. We can identify a problem, examine the evidence, consider the options and legislate to address it. That is what I have sought to do with the Bill, which began with conversations in my constituency 12 years ago. It has drawn extensively on legal frameworks to address a gap in Northern Ireland's law. I recognise that there is more work to be done. However, there is a risk that, in concentrating on the difficulties of legislation, we lose sight of the consequences of not legislating. There are real considerations when it comes to the difficulty of reaching agreement on the age threshold, the complexity of financial services, the need for appropriate exceptions and the financial implications of implementation, and they deserve examination. However, so, too, does the consequence of continuing to leave people without protection. We have had more than a decade to discuss the issue. We know that the gap exists and that other jurisdictions have established legal frameworks to address it. We know that people in Northern Ireland continue to lack an equivalent protection. At some point, we have to move beyond recognising that a problem exists and take responsibility for addressing it. That opportunity is before us today. The Bill is not about me, any one Member or political party: it is about the people whom we all represent; the older person who wants to continue living independently, the young adult who is beginning to access services in their own right, the person who is seeking healthcare, insurance, accommodation or other essential service, and the person who experiences unjustified age discrimination and finds that the particular legal protection that they need is currently absent. The people who first raised that with me were asking for something entirely reasonable: their age should not be a reason for unfair treatment. They were asking that, when discrimination occurs, the law provides meaningful protection. That is what the Bill seeks to achieve. It is a substantial piece of draft legislation. It is an important change for our equality framework. It is long overdue. I commend the Age Discrimination (Goods, Facilities and Services) Bill to the House. I ask Members to support its passing Second Stage.
Will the Member give way?
I appreciate that point, and I have considered it since the Committee meeting. My understanding is that the way in which the legislation is written needs to allow flexibility when it comes to the age group. If a policy can be justified or if flexibility can be demonstrated, arguably, they have not committed age discrimination. However, if they cannot do that, the legislation might cover that situation. Certainly, the guidance from the Equality Commission will be able to advise on that, because the point is not that there will be an arbitrary age or a line but that it is about an age group. Where it can be demonstrated that a particular group suffers from disadvantage, they potentially will be covered under positive action. I agree that we have to reflect on that more.
Will the Member give way?
I looked at that one too, because I thought that it followed a similar rule. However, the concessionary fares scheme was enacted by legislation, and the Bill would not override any existing legislation. Therefore, in that example, the Bill would not necessarily override that policy, because it is already protected as part of a statutory framework.

5,027 words. Text as published by the Northern Ireland Assembly.

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