Debate contribution: Conversion Practices (Criminalisation) Bill: Second Stage

Debate contribution by Mr Gordon Lyons on 28 September 2026.

MLA: Mr Gordon Lyons
Party at the time: Democratic Unionist Party
Date: 28 September 2026
Type: Debate contribution (made as a minister)
Business: Private Members' Business
Heading: Conversion Practices (Criminalisation) Bill: Second Stage
Assembly identifier: Official Report component 5762939

Text

I am glad that the Member has acknowledged that that reassurance needs to be given. I recognise his other point as well, but I will come to that shortly. Of course, this is all about definitions. What does it mean to intend to suppress or change someone's gender identity? We have been over, time and again, what that means and looks like, so there is still a concern there. Those issues have not been done away with or made any easier to deal with. It is misleading to suggest that the provisions in the Bill are directly comparable with those in the Domestic Abuse Act. Similar language has been adopted, but it has been placed within a significantly different legislative framework. The issue before us is not whether coercive behaviour should be prohibited; it is whether the offence is defined with sufficient clarity that an ordinary person can reasonably understand where lawful conduct ends and criminal conduct begins and can distinguish genuinely harmful conduct from lawful and legitimate supportive, pastoral and professional interactions. The issue of intent in the Bill further illustrates the challenge of clarity in it. For each of the offences, it is specified that the accused has:
"the intent of changing or suppressing ... sexual orientation or gender identity".
That goes to the heart of how those offences would operate in practice, but it relies on a potentially vague or uncertain assessment of what was perceived. A person may have a conversation with someone that is intended as one of care or concern, but it could be perceived as an attempt to change or suppress their identity. We should be extremely cautious before creating offences where the dividing line between lawful conduct and criminal conduct is unclear. It is also specified for each offence that the victim would suffer "physical or psychological" harm, which is certainly reasonable, with psychological harm being defined as "fear, alarm or distress". My concern is about those who simply attempt to offer support, do not in any way intend to cause harm and do nothing that could reasonably be considered to cause harm but still fall foul of the legislation. I also have concerns about the Bill's use of the term "gender identity". The reason why that matters is straightforward. The term is not a peripheral feature of the Bill; it sits at the heart of the proposed offences and is therefore capable of having significant legal consequences. The Bill introduces its own definition of gender identity, providing that it is:
"(a) what the victim considers it to be, and (b) what the person considers it to be."
My concern is not that the Bill seeks to address questions relating to gender identity but whether the definition provided gives sufficient legal certainty for legislation that creates criminal offences. During the debate, Members have heard differing explanations of what the term might mean and how it may be intended to operate. We have also had back and forth between Members and the Chair about whether the issues can even be debated. Why did that become an issue in the House? It did so because these are sensitive, contested issues. They became issues because we do not know what they mean. That, in itself, should give us pause for thought. If there is uncertainty in the Chamber about the meaning and practical application of a key term, we should carefully consider the challenges that might arise for members of the public, the police, prosecutors and, ultimately, the courts. I make the point again: criminal law should be capable of being understood by those who are subject to it, and it should be applied consistently by those who enforce it. Good legislation should reduce uncertainty, not create it. Where a term is central to the operation of a criminal offence, the Assembly should be confident not only that it can be defined but that it can be applied consistently and predictably in practice. That threshold has not been met. There were laughs and guffaws around the Chamber as some of my colleagues gave ridiculous examples of certain gender identities. The examples were laughed at because they were so ridiculous, but they are real to many people. That is why it is so important that the issues be teased out: the lack of certainty. The use of the term "suppressing" in relation to sexual orientation or gender identity is problematic, and there is a lack of clarity on what that might entail. I draw Members' attention to what has been described as the "reasonableness defence" that applies to each of the offences. The provision is intended to provide reassurance that conduct that is "reasonable in the particular circumstances" will not attract criminal liability. We need to look carefully at how that protection operates. The burden is not on the prosecution to establish that the conduct was unreasonable; instead, the burden of establishing the reasonableness defence rests with the accused.
I recognise that reverse burdens of that kind are not unprecedented in criminal law, but we should not regard that as insignificant, because it engages an important and long-standing principle of criminal justice: that an individual is presumed innocent and that ordinarily it is for the prosecution to establish criminal liability.
My key concern is that this does not answer the wider issue about the potential chilling effect of the legislation. For someone trying to decide in advance whether a difficult conversation or a piece of advice is lawful, being told that they may ultimately be able to establish that their conduct was reasonable is not necessarily the reassurance that it first might appear to be. They still face the prospect of an investigation and potentially having to rely on and establish that defence before a court. For all of those reasons, I am not convinced that the Bill satisfies the first test of clarity. That is why we must ask whether we have sufficient clarity on the offences and the confidence that people can understand in advance where the boundary of criminal conduct lies. My second concern is about whether the Bill draws the boundary in the right place. Of course, harmful and coercive conduct should be prohibited, but the challenge for legislators is to ensure that, in doing so, we do not inadvertently capture lawful conduct as well. It is here that I have concerns about the scope of the proposed offences. Mr Tennyson seems content, however, that normal everyday scenarios will not be captured by the Bill. Let me give you an example. What about a boy who comes to his parent and says, "I want to be a girl"? If the parent shows concern and tries to steer the child in some way and dampen down those notions, would that parent be implicated by the legislation? Mr Tennyson would say, "No, of course not". However, let us look at what the legislation says. Clause 4 states:
"a person provides or carries out conversion therapy if the person provides or carries out any of the following ... (b) coaching or instruction".
The parent in my example could be described as instructing the child. Clause 1(1)(b) states:
"the person has the intent of ... suppressing the ... gender identity".
The parent could be described as having attempted to suppress those inclinations. The definition of psychological harm in clause 8 includes "alarm or distress". The child could decide at the time or later in life that they felt distressed following that conversation. The parent who is trying to care for their child and guide them could, it seems to me, reasonably be captured by the legislation. I have asked the House to tell me where I am wrong in this —.
I thought the Member might bite on that.

1,293 words. Text as published by the Northern Ireland Assembly.

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