Debate contribution: Justice Bill: Consideration Stage

Debate contribution by Mr Maurice Bradley on 9 June 2026.

MLA: Mr Maurice Bradley
Party at the time: Democratic Unionist Party
Date: 9 June 2026
Type: Debate contribution
Business: Executive Committee Business
Heading: Justice Bill: Consideration Stage
Assembly identifier: Official Report component 5601948

Text

Before I speak to the amendments in group 4, I pay tribute to the Alliance Member, who is not in her place, for her sterling work and dedication throughout the Katie Simpson murder investigation. She deserves praise for that. As a member of the Justice Committee, I wish to speak to the group of amendments and, at the outset, express thanks to the Chairman, Paul Frew, my colleague Brian Kingston, fellow Committee members and the Committee staff for their work in bringing the Justice Bill to what is now the halfway stage. I would also like to express thanks to the Minister for her work in achieving that. The amendments deal primarily with police discipline, police accountability, the powers of the Police Ombudsman and the establishment of a police barred list and police advisory list. I acknowledge that PSNI officers continue to undertake their role in difficult times. We must not lose sight of that. Taken together, the amendments represent some of the most significant reforms to police accountability arrangements that the Assembly has considered for many years. We acknowledge that some of the reforms did not come before the Committee. They will therefore require further scrutiny and discussion. Hopefully, the Committee Chairman and the Minister of Justice will deal with that issue throughout the summer months. The powers for the Police Ombudsman and the establishment of a police barred list and a police advisory list are very good. Taken together, they represent some of the most significant reforms to police accountability that the Assembly has considered. I am sorry for repeating myself. They seek to address legitimate concerns that victims, oversight bodies and the wider public have raised about the ability of officers to evade scrutiny through resignation or retirement, as well as concerns about former officers. Members of the Justice Committee have repeatedly stressed that confidence in the justice system depends not only on effective policing but on accountability, transparency and public trust. The public must have confidence that allegations of serious misconduct will be properly investigated and, where necessary, acted on. Equally, police officers are entitled to fair procedures and to protection from arbitrary or disproportionate action. It is therefore important that we assess the amendments through the lens of balance. Do they strengthen accountability? Do they protect the public interest? Do they maintain procedural fairness? Are they practical and proportionate? I will begin with amendment No 68, which concerns disciplinary proceedings against former police officers. Historically, one of the most persistent criticisms of police disciplinary systems throughout these islands has been that officers can retire or resign before proceedings are completed. In many instances, that has left serious allegations unresolved and left victims and complainants feeling that justice has not been served. The amendment seeks to address that issue by allowing disciplinary proceedings to continue in certain circumstances after an officer has ceased to serve. The principle behind that is understandable. The public rightly expect that accountability should not simply disappear when an individual leaves the organisation. Where there are allegations of serious misconduct, particularly misconduct that would have led to dismissal had the officer remained in service, there is a legitimate public interest in ensuring that the matter can be examined. The amendment introduces several conditions that must be satisfied before proceedings can continue. Importantly, where allegations emerge after an officer has left the service and are outside the normal period, proceedings may continue only where the Police Ombudsman considers such action to be reasonable and proportionate. I welcome that safeguard. It introduces an independent assessment and requires consideration of three important factors: the seriousness of the alleged misconduct; the impact on public confidence in policing; and the wider public interest. Those tests are important, because they recognise that not every historical complaint should automatically trigger disciplinary proceedings years after an officer has left service. There must be proportionality. There must be a clear public interest. There must be a recognition that memories fade, that evidence becomes more difficult to obtain and that fairness applies to respondents as well as complainants. That balance is reflected in the amendment, so it should be welcomed. I also encourage the Minister to ensure, however, that any regulations developed under the provisions provide clarity about timescales and evidential thresholds. Uncertainty benefits nobody. Victims deserve clarity. Former officers deserve clarity. The public deserve clarity. Without clear guidance, however, there is a risk that expectations will be raised that cannot ultimately be fulfilled. Amendment No 69 and the substantial provisions in proposed new schedule 5 under amendment No 127 will create a police barred list and a police advisory list. In many respects, they are among the most significant reforms in the Bill. The purpose is straightforward: an individual who has been dismissed for serious misconduct, or who would have been dismissed had they remained in service, should not simply move elsewhere within policing or law enforcement without that history being known. That is a principle that most Members will find difficult to oppose. The public rightly expect that those entrusted with significant powers, including powers of arrest, detention and investigation, meet the highest standards of integrity. When those standards are breached in a serious way, there must be consequences. The police barred list seeks to ensure precisely that by creating a formal mechanism to prevent individuals who have been dismissed for serious misconduct from obtaining employment elsewhere in policing or law enforcement. In practical terms, that closes a loophole that has existed for far too long. The barred list also extends beyond PSNI officers, covering police support staff, senior officers, airport police, harbour police and various categories of personnel who exercise law enforcement functions. Having that breadth is important. Public confidence depends not on organisational labels but on standards. The standards expected of those exercising public authority should therefore apply consistently. The Justice Committee has long recognised the importance of public confidence in policing. Confidence is built not solely through operational success but through trust, accountability and demonstrating that misconduct has consequences. The police barred list therefore represents a potentially important step forward. I caution, however, that safeguards are equally important. A decision that effectively prevents an individual from working in policing or law enforcement can have lifelong consequences. Such decisions must therefore be robust, transparent and capable of challenge. I note positively that the legislation provides mechanisms for removal from the barred list where dismissals are overturned or found to be unfair. That is essential. No accountability system can command confidence unless it contains effective safeguards against error. Justice requires both accountability and fairness; one cannot exist without the other. The creation of a police advisory list is perhaps less well known, but it may be equally important. Unlike the barred list, the advisory list is for situations where allegations remain unresolved because an individual resigns or retires before proceedings have concluded. That addresses a long-standing concern. If an individual leaves during an investigation, future employers may be unaware that serious allegations exist. The advisory list seeks to ensure that the relevant information is available when future employment is considered. Again, I understand that principle. The public would rightly question a system that allows unresolved allegations simply to disappear. However, I also believe that careful implementation will be critical. Inclusion on an advisory list is not the same as a finding of misconduct. That distinction is extremely important. Natural justice requires that unresolved allegations are treated differently from proven misconduct. I therefore encourage the Department to ensure that appropriate safeguards, review mechanisms and data protection arrangements are in place. The objective is to have informed decision-making, not prejudgement. That distinction matters greatly. I turn to amendment Nos 76 and 77, which relate to the Police Ombudsman. Our party has reservations about those and will seek clarification on them. The amendments provide the ombudsman with powers to submit reports to the appropriate authority before investigations or criminal proceedings have concluded where certain conditions are met. The intention behind the amendments is understandable, but we still need clarity. Where there is compelling evidence of gross misconduct and where it is considered to be in the public interest for an officer to cease serving without delay, there should be mechanisms available to address that situation. Police confidence can be seriously damaged when officers who face extremely serious allegations remain in post for extended periods while processes continue. The amendments therefore seek to address that concern, but I still have reservations. One of the cornerstones of our justice system is due process. Criminal investigations and disciplinary investigations frequently overlap. The danger in creating mechanisms for accelerated disciplinary action is that they may unintentionally prejudice criminal proceedings or create perceptions of prejudgement. I note that the amendments contain a safeguard in that they require consideration where misconduct proceedings would prejudice criminal proceedings. That safeguard is welcome; nevertheless, I believe that careful consideration is required regarding the practical operation of those provisions. The Assembly must be satisfied that the pursuit of speed does not compromise fairness. Public confidence is enhanced when decisions are both swift and robust. The challenge lies in achieving both objectives simultaneously. Throughout scrutiny of justice legislation, a recurring theme emerges, which is that the public and victims expect accountability, but accountability must never be at the expense of expediency. The justice system functions effectively when decisions are evidence-based, proportionate and fair. That principle should guide the implementation of every amendment before us. The amendments that deal with former officers acknowledge that accountability and the fact that it should not automatically end at retirement. The barred list recognises that serious misconduct should carry meaningful consequences. The advisory list recognises that unresolved allegations remain relevant to future employment decisions. The ombudsman amendments seek to strengthen the ability to respond to serious cases where public confidence may otherwise be undermined. While each of those objectives may be legitimate, the amendments raise serious concerns about their outworking. Each also requires careful implementation. The Assembly should therefore continue to monitor how the powers operate in practice. The Justice Committee will undoubtedly take an interest in how regulations are developed and how those arrangements function once enacted.
Policing is among the most challenging professions in our society. Thousands of officers and staff serve honourably every day under significant pressure. Nothing in these amendments should be interpreted as criticism of those who carry out their duties professionally and with integrity. Indeed, effective accountability mechanisms ultimately strengthen policing because they reinforce public confidence in the overwhelming majority who do their jobs diligently. Strong accountability protects good officers as much as it protects the public. When misconduct occurs, it damages confidence in the entire service. Addressing misconduct effectively, therefore, serves the interests of policing itself. That is why it is so important that these reforms strike the correct balance. In conclusion, I believe that these amendments represent a significant and largely positive development in police accountability arrangements. The provisions that relate to former officers address an obvious gap in the current system. The creation of a police barred list closes a loophole that should never have existed. The police advisory list provides greater transparency with regard to unsolved allegations. The ombudsman provisions seek to ensure that serious misconduct can, where circumstances require, be addressed more effectively. However, the success of the reforms will, ultimately, depend not on what is written in legislation but on how those powers are exercised in practice. The guiding principles must remain those of proportionality, transparency, fairness and public confidence. If those principles are maintained, these amendments have the potential to strengthen trust in policing and confidence in the wider justice system. For those reasons, while recognising that continued scrutiny will be necessary, I welcome the intent behind these amendments but, without further clarification, I do not see how they can work. We will wait to see how the rest of the debate unfolds.

1,978 words. Text as published by the Northern Ireland Assembly.

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